On the other hand, the tricky question is, "How much is enough"? We have the government meddling in the economy because we deluded ourselves leading up to 1929 and then panicked when we saw where we'd ended up, triggering a bust that left the economy struggling for a decade. We have the government meddling in food safety because free market forces proved insufficient to protect the average consumer from death at the hands of the unscrupulous and incompetent. We have the government meddling in construction for basically the same reason - people died when this person or that took short-cuts, either from deliberate indifference or because they honestly thought it would do no harm. We have government meddling in mining, transportation, agriculture, pharmacy, and on and on, because someone died at the hands of an unseen stranger who, never meaning to kill, nonetheless made an unwise and deadly decision.

Feb. 21, 2003
The Station, a Rhode Island nightclub, hosted the heavy metal band, Great White. They were a popular group, and it was a popular night-club. Who allowed what is hotly debated, but what is clear is that the band used fireworks in their show, that the fireworks ignited soundproofing materials on the stage, and that the subsequent fire raced quickly through the structure and killed 100 people including a member of the band. A local station in to collect footage of a nightclub that had passed its fire inspection - as part of a story on another nightclub fire - ended up filming a disaster from the inside out as the crew escaped the blaze; that video has become part of the training program for Federal and State construction inspectors across the nation, highlighting the multiple small mistakes, misjudgments, and rule-breakings that can accumulate into a major catastrophe.

Item: the band had no permit for fireworks.

Item: the foam used behind the stage for soundproofing was not intended for that application. It was intended for packaging. It had not been treated with the fire-retardant materials used in acoustic foam. It burned quickly and hotly - so quickly and evenly that the crowd initially thought it was an intended special-effect and did not react for the first 25 seconds, the band playing without recognizing the seriousness of the situation for the first 30 seconds. The hot gasses and flames spread quickly across the ceiling, igniting it: according to the NIST report, within 90 seconds the conditions at head height were lethal, with temperatures approaching 1400 degrees F, and smoke extended to within a foot of the floor (where later tests indicated victims would experience oven-like temperatures in the 600-700 degree range). But most of the victims likely died quickly of suffocation, since the NIST simulation indicated that the oxygen content in the room would have dropped sharply to a quarter or less of normal over the period from 70 to 90 seconds after ignition.

Item: the nightclub was at nearly twice its maximum occupancy. 462 people crowded into the structure. The main door opened into a narrow hall that led to an interior door and then the ticket booth before opening onto the main floor; this limited the speed of exit and led to a crowd-crush effect when the bulk of patrons tried to exit back through it, especially when the quickly spreading smoke forced occupants to crouch to stay beneath the lethal zone. Most victims were found in that hall or in the adjoining rooms approaching it. An exit door near the stage was partly blocked by boxes and equipment belonging to the very camera crew who ended up filming the entire tragedy, though this did not seem to be a factor in the calamity. Most patrons were simply unaware of the alternate exits and made for the only exit they knew; the quick spread of smoke concealed signs for the alternate exits, and the quick depletion of the air incapacitated most of the victims before they could seek alternate routes.

96 died in the structure, 4 more died from burns after being pulled out and taken to area hospitals. Another 36 were hospitalized with severe burns, lung damage, or both. About a third of the survivors escaped through the front door, some of those being pulled through after crowding and smoke had caused everyone in the exit hall to fall to the floor. Another 46 escaped through a side door before conditions in that room became too deadly, and another 30 or so escaped through two other exits. About a third of the survivors exited through windows, sustaining cuts, after it was clear the main exit was blocked. Had the nightclub limited itself to capacity, most or all would have escaped.

Item: contrary to the belief of the town's fire inspectors, the nightclub was not exempt from the requirement to have fire sprinklers. Though the structure itself pre-dated the requirement, it had lost its exemption under law when it converted from a restaurant to a nightclub. A subsequent computer simulation by NIST indicated that a sprinkler system would have delayed the fire enough to save most or all occupants.